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ments settling alimony and property rights of the parties upon
divorce... [and] such agreements should no longer be held to be
void ab initio as 'contrary to public policy.' ",26 This decision is
illustrative of a more situationalist approach to antenuptial alimony agreements. As the Posner court noted, "With divorce such
a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that many prospective marriage partners ...

might want to consider ...

the dis-

position of their property and the ailmony rights of the wife in the
event their marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail."2M
Henry C. Bowen
Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970).
21Id. at 384.

Draft Law-Requirements For
Classification And Exemption As
Conscientious Objector
Elliott Ashton Welsh, II, was convicted in a United States District Court for refusal to submit to induction into the Armed Forces.1 Welsh contended that section 6 (j) 2 of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act exempted him from service in the armed
forces because he was conscientiously opposed to war as a result
of his "religious training and belief." 3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Welsh had no religious
basis for his conscientious objection claim and therefore affirmed
the conviction. 4 Welsh then petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, which was granted on the basis of that court's
decision in United States v. Seeger.' Held, reversed. The decision
of the court of appeals was found to be inconsistent with the
Court's holding in Seeger.
150 App. U.S.C. § 462 (a) (1968).
150 App. U.S.C. § 456 (j) (Supp. V 1970):

Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
As used in this subsection, the term "religion training and belief,"
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code. ...
sWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
4Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
33380 U.S. 163 (1965), affg, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'g.,
216 F. Supp.

516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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The facts are quite similar in both the Seeger and Welsh cases.
Both Seeger and Welsh were unwilling to sign the section of the
Selective Service Form which stated: "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form." Welsh signed the statement only after striking
the words "religious training and". Seeger struck the words "training and". Both were unable to affirm or deny that they believed
in a "Supreme Being". Both did confirm that they were conscientiously opposed to taking part in any war which resulted in the loss
of human life.
Originally, under the 1917 Draft Act,8 in order to qualify
for conscientious objector status the registrant had to be a
member of a well-recognized religious sect which forbade its members to participate in war in any form. However, our tradition
allows a broad diversity in religious belief, and in recent years the
prevailing wisdom has expanded this concept even further. This
has resulted in the recognition that religious belief is a matter of
fundamental attitude and dispositon toward life and the world and
not just a matter of theology. 10 Consequently, the grounds for conscientious objection exemption have been broadened under new interpretations of the Draft Act. 1
In 1965, in United States v. Seeger, a major decision reflecting
this new train of thought was delivered by the Court. There were
subsequent interpretations of this case upholding Seeger's flexible
view of the requirement that the conscientious objection applicant have a conviction based upon religious training and belief.'In Seeger, itself, the Court had attempted to lay down a test:
6Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 (1970).
7 Id.

s Selective Service Act of 1917, Ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
9 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir. 1942). Even under the
1940 Selective Service and Training Act it was held that a registrant whose
opposition to war was based upon his philosophical and political convictions
was not entitled to classification as a conscientious objector. See United States
v. Bowles, 131 F.2d 818 (3rd Cir. 1942).
10 See United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163 (1965); Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2nd
Cir. 1943). With the recognition of the existence of so many diverse religious
beliefs, the problem with a narrow construction of the provisions of section
6 (j) becomes apparent.
" See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); United States v. Irons,
369 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.

1965).

12 E.g., United States v. Stolberg, 346 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1965); Draft registrant Stolberg stated that by belief he was opposed to combat and killing of
human beings. The court granted him conscientious objector status even though
it found it difficult to determine exactly what Stolberg's religious beliefs
were. Stolberg stated that he believed in a Supreme Being but he did not
believe the Supreme Being constituted a force outside of man.
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Within that phase [religious training and belief]
would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based
upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else
is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these
words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
comes within the statutory definition."
This Supreme Court decision made it apparent that an applicant could not be denied exemption on the ground that his beliefs
were based upon political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
purely personal code, unless this was the only basis of his claim
for exemption.24 It appears to be unnecessary to determine the
source of the belief as long as it is not derived solely from political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a purely personal moral
code.1 5
With the Seeger decision the fear arose that the "floodgates"
to conscientious objection exemptions had been opened. The dissatisfaction with Seeger prompted the Committee on Armed Services
to rewrite this section of the Act in 1967. The new law still provided that a conscientious objection exemption claim must be based
upon religious training and belief. Congress changed the definition of "religious training and belief" intending to restrict the
availability of the conscientious objection.' 6 However, it is difficult
to put a construction on the section which varies greatly from the
test set forth in the Seeger case.
The Court in Welsh closely followed the Seeger decision and
the test set forth in that opinion. In Welsh the Court ruled that
the exclusions set forth in Section 6 (j) "of those persons with
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a mere13United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
14 Beliefs which are based exclusively upon political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a purely personal moral code, do not fall within the statu-

tory exemption because they are not religious. United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); accord, Morin v. Grade, 301 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Wis. 1969);

In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968); Lee v. Crouse, 284 F.
Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1967).
S5 Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 1965). The court
stated:
The use by Congress [in Section 6 (j)] of the words "merely per-

sonal" seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which is
not personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief
and is in no way related to a Supreme Being.
18 Morin v. Grade, 301 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Wis. 1969). Congress deleted
from the definition of religious training and belief (section 6 (j)) the phrase

"an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
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ly personal moral code,"17 should not be so construed as to exclude
those persons "who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy."' 8 The Court went on to specify that
there were two groups of registrants that were definitely excluded
from conscientious objection status. These were those people who
did not hold their beliefs deeply and those people whose objections
were based "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or
expediency."O
Basically, the test set out in Welsh is if an individual deeply
and sincerely 2o holds ethical or moral beliefs [even though not predicated on traditional religion]2 which impose upon the individual the duty to refrain from participating in war in any form "
such individual is entitled to conscientious objection exemption,
even if the belief is held in conjunction with, reinforced by, or
even substantially founded on philosophical, sociological or political views. 23 As a further qualification, the belief must occupy "in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of
those admittedly qualifying for the exemption ... "24
Because of the decision in Welsh and Seeger, there will be
some problems in applying the conscientious objection test to draft
17 Welsh

v. United States, 398 U.S. 833, 889 (1970).
18 Id.
29 Id.
20 In Welsh v. United States, 898 U.S. 833, 342 (1970),
the Court stated
that the individuals who do fall within the exclusions from the exemption are
those individuals "whose beliefs are not deeply held".
21 1d. at 341: "Welsh struck the word 'religious' entirely and later characterized his beliefs as having been formed 'by reading in the fields of history
and sociology'." The Court pointed out that Welsh was not "aware of the
broad scope of the word religious as used in § 6 (j) ..
" Upon reflection Welsh
wrote a letter "in which he declared that his beliefs were certainly religious in
the ethical sense of the word." (emphasis added). Id at 341.
22 Welsh "strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and
immoral," and his conscience forbade him "to take part in such an evil practice."
Id. at 337.
23 In Welsh v. United States, 398 US. at 342, the court recognized that
"Welsh's conscientious objection to war was undeniably based in part on his
perception of world politics." However the court went on to note:
We certainly do not think that § 6 0) 's exclusion of those per.
sons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code" should be read to exclude those who
hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even
those whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is
founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy.
Id. at 842.
24 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 383, 39 (1970), quoting from Seeger,
380 U.S. at 176. "The government concedes that [Welsh's] beliefs are held with
the strength of more traditional religious convictions." Id. at 357.
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registrants. 25 The local boards will have to remember, when considering conscientious objection applications, that they are dealing
with the beliefs of different individuals which will be articulated
in a multitude of ways. In such a situation, the claim of the registrant that his beliefs are sincere must be given great weight." The
local boards and the courts should not reject beliefs merely because
they are incomprehensible to them. It is their task to decide
whether an individual sincerely holds his beliefs and whether
those beliefs are, in the individual's own scheme of things, religious.27
One must realize that the Welsh case has not removed religion as the basis for conscientious objection. It has merely broadened the definition of "religious" as used in the Selective Service
Act. 28 The Court has no doubt stretched and pulled the meaning

25There does not appear to be any single standard by which the draft
board, and subsequently the courts, can determine that one's conscientious objection is based upon "religious training and belief". The courts, in making
their determination on the validity of the objection, may base their decisions
to a great extent on the results of interviews conducted by chaplains or ministers. Since these interviews are oriented toward theological and philosophical
doctrines, it is obvious that the more widely read and well-educated individual
will more likely qualify for the exemption than will the less-educated individual. The advocate skilled in the art of persuasion is also in a favored position.
28 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965): "Men may believe what
they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious Experiences which are as real to life to some may be
incomprehensible to others." Id. at 184; cf. United States v. Washington, 392
F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1968); Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946);
State v. Amana Soc'y, 132 Iowa 304, 109 N.W. 894 (1906).
27Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341:
The Court's statement in Seeger that a registrant's characterization
of his own belief as "religious" should carry great weight . . . does
not imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should
be treated similarly. When a registrant states that hi objections to war
are "religious", that information is highly relevant to the question of
the function his beliefs have in his life. But very few registrants are
fully aware of the broad scope of the word "religious" as used in
§ 6 (j), and accordingly a registrant's statement that his beliefs are
nonreligious is a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption.
See also
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
28
In Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the court said that it was
not necessary, for purposes of § 6 (j), that a person's "religious" belief which
he asserted as the basis for conscientious objection be of the traditional type.
The Court held that the objection was based on "religious" grounds if it stemmed from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right
and wrong, so long as these beliefs were held with the same strength as traditional religious convictions. The court further said that § 6 (j) did not necessarily exclude those persons who have strong beliefs about the nation's forei
and domestic affairs, nor whose conscientious objection is founded to a substantial degree upon public policy considerations.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 16

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

of religion so that it could avoid the first amenment question of
whether Congress can constitutionally exempt consciousious objectors from military service."s
Robert R. Fredeking, 11
9 It must be pointed out that there is a constitutional question involved

in the conscientious objection cases. Section 6 () of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors;
consequently it could be argued that it discriminates between different forms
of religious expression in violation of the first amendment's establishment and
free exercise clauses and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See
Laurie, Conscientious Objection-Some Constitutional Questions, 73 W. VA. L.
REV. 138 (1971).

Emient Domain-De Facto Taking
Defendant was notified that its property was in an area to be
condemned for urban renewal. The proposed condemnation was
initiated in 1954 but postponed until 1967, at which time defendant's property was formally condemned under the authority of a
provision of the New York General Municipal Law, which authorizes a city to condemn property for urban renewal projects. During
the interim the project was highly publicized; as a result, property in the area came into disrepair causing property values to decrease appreciably. Defendant was ordered to move from its property, which it did in April, 1963. By the time defendant moved its
property had become unsalable and unrentable, but defendant continued to maintain it, pay taxes and carry insurance on it. The trial
court held the city's actions constituted a de facto taking of defendan's property at the time defendant vacated it in 1963, and that
defendant should be reimbursed for its expenses in maintaining the
property until acquired by plaintiff in 1967. Held modified and affirmed. The condemning authority's actions so interferred with
the defendant's use and ownership of the property that the essential elements of ownership were destroyed and a de facto taking
occurred even though there was no physical invasion or legal
'N.Y. GEaN. MuN. LAw § 555 (McKinney Supp. 1970) amending N.Y. GEiN.
MuN. LAW § 555 (McKinney 1965) provides:
Real property or any interest therein. . ..
necessary for or incidental to any urban xenewal program or part thereof in accordance
with an urban renewal plan may be acquired by an agency by gift,
grant, devise, purchase, condemnation or otherwise and by a municipality for and on behalf of an agency by condemnation. Property may

be acquired by condemnation by an agency or by a municipality for an
agency pursuant to the condemnation law or pursauant to the laws
relating to the condemnation of land by the municipality for which
the agency is acting or the municipality, as the case may be.
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